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Abstract—Multi-access edge computing (MEC) is a promising architecture to provide low-latency applications for future Internet of
Things (IoT)-based network systems. Together with the increasing scholarly attention on task offloading, the problem of edge servers’
resource allocation has been widely studied. Most of previous works focus on a single edge server (ES) serving multiple terminal entities
(TEs), which restricts their access to sufficient resources. In this paper, we consider a MEC resource transaction market with multiple
ESs and multiple TEs, which are interdependent and mutually influence each other. However, this many-to-many interaction requires
resolving several problems, including task allocation, TEs’ selection on ESs and conflicting interests of both parties. Game theory can
be used as an effective tool to realize the interests of two or more conflicting individuals in the trading market. Therefore, we propose
a bilateral game framework among multiple ESs and multiple TEs by modeling the task outsourcing problem as two noncooperative
games: the supplier and customer side games. In the first game, the supply function bidding mechanism is employed to model the ESs’
profit maximization problem. The ESs submit their bids to the scheduler, where the computing service price is computed and sent to
the TEs. While in the second game, TEs determine the optimal demand profiles according to ESs’ bids to maximize their payoff. The
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the aforementioned games are proved. A distributed task outsourcing algorithm
(DTOA) is designed to determine the equilibrium. Simulation results have demonstrated the superior performance of DTOA in increasing
the ESs’ profit and TEs’ payoff, as well as flattening the peak and off-peak load.
Index Terms—Multi-access edge computing (MEC), Internet of Things (IoT), Task outsourcing, Bidding mechanism, Noncooperative
game, Nash equilibrium.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a system of interrelated
tens of billions of resource-hungry terminal entities (TEs),
such as, sensors, wearable devices and unmanned aerial
vehicles, which transfer data over a network with little or
no human intervention. With the development of TEs and
wireless networks, the demand for low-latency computing
services has been growing exponentially. This paves the way
for the development of Multi-access edge computing (MEC).
Multi-access edge computing (MEC) enables a power-
ful cloud at the edge of the network. MEC decentralizes
networks and allows any enterprise or mobile operator to
place a cloud at the edge, adjacent to the user. In the MEC
paradigm, plenty of machines are placed at the edge of the
network so that computing services can be deployed on
them for fast execution [1]. The MEC locates edge servers
(ESs) with limited storage and computing resources at the
edge of networks. Since the computation capabilities and
battery lives of TEs are limited, TEs offload computationally
intensive tasks (e.g., program execution) to ESs (e.g., 4G/5G
base stations). The ESs execute these offloaded tasks and
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return results to TEs. However, to take full advantage of
these available computational resources of ESs, TEs’ tasks
need to be allocated appropriately [2] .
Due to the resource constraints of ESs, some computa-
tionally intensive tasks will be offloaded to cloud servers
(CSs), which are normally distantly located. In that case,
a higher transmission latency may be generated, which
seriously degrades the quality of service (QoS). Moreover,
task offloading from ESs to CSs incurs extra latency and
energy consumption due to communication between TEs
and CSs. Some important problems to be solved are how
to satisfy the latency requirements of TEs and reduce the
energy consumption in MEC. In order to meet a strict QoS,
Nafiseh et al. [3] proposed a two-sided matching mechanism
for edge services considering QoS requirements in terms of
service response time.
In order to achieve low-latency and energy-saving com-
putations, several studies on task offloading in MEC have
been proposed. Xinchen Lyu et al. [4] have attempted to
encapsulate the latency requirements in offloading tasks
and designed a selective offloading scheme. This scheme
is achieved by enabling the devices to be self-denied or self-
nominated for offloading. This can save energy consump-
tion and minimize delays for task offloading. Authors in [5]
developed a threshold-based strategy to improve the QoS,
which combines the advantages of ESs’ with lower latency
and abundant computational resources of CSs. A priority
queue is also applied to solve the delay problem, wherein
delay-sensitive tasks are executed ahead of delay-tolerant
tasks.
However, most previous studies examined a single ES
2serving multiple TEs. In fact, the proliferation of applica-
tions puts a heavy load on the ESs. Since the ES has limited
computing capacity and can’t accommodate enough tasks,
some task processes may have to wait longer to wake up.
Thus, for a single ES is hard to cope with concurrent tasks
of multiple TEs, which will hinder the development and
popularity of MEC. In the future MEC market, there will be
multiple different ESs offering optional computing service
to TEs. Hence, TEs can choose different ESs according to
their real-time and cost requirements. In that case, multiple
ESs provide computing services in parallel, which can accel-
erate the speed of task processing and alleviate offloading
delays.
Task outsourcing has been employed as an effective
paradigm by accommodating as many on-demand tasks as
possible. Its principle is to distribute TEs’ tasks in different
time slots according to ESs’ load of each time slot. Our
work focuses on the problem of offloaded tasks outsourc-
ing. It differs from most existing works which focus on
the necessity of offloading or on selecting which tasks to
be offloaded to ESs or CSs. The TEs’ offloaded tasks are
mapped to ESs according to their resource capacities. Thus,
task outsourcing can enhance scalability of MEC and satisfy
TEs’ dynamic service demands.
Fig. 1 describes a MEC communication network in IoT,
where ESs are deployed densely near TEs. The MEC net-
work is similar to a real competitive market, in which a
wide range of TEs can be grouped into virtual clusters and
compete for the ESs’ limited wireless resources. They are
interdependent and mutually influence each other. Several
base stations with ESs also compete with each other to
win more TEs. The ESs can communicate with the TEs via
scheduler and inform them of their real-time service prices.
Through the scheduler, TEs can participate in ESs selection,
and make wise decisions regarding their daily computing
resources consumption.
Terminal entities (TEs)
Signal Link
Base station with edge server (ES)
Fig. 1: The MEC network scenario in IoT.
However, one of the main challenges of task outsourcing
is to consider the interests of both parties. On the one hand,
ESs aim to get more profits, and strive for attracting more
TEs to use their computing resources. On the other hand,
a rational TE will choose a task strategy that maximizes its
own payoff. Game theory can be used as an effective tool to
model the interests of two or more conflicting individuals
in trading markets and also load balancing in distributed
systems [6]. The game solution was proved to be a Nash
equilibrium solution for the noncooperative game.
In this paper, we propose a bilateral game framework
among multiple ESs (the suppliers) and multiple TEs (the
customers) to model the task outsourcing problem as two
noncooperative games. These two games are related to each
other and are played simultaneously. In the first game, the
supply function bidding mechanism is employed to model
the noncooperative game among ESs. In the proposed
scheme, each ES, with limited or idle resources, submits
a bid to reveal the available capacity “supplied” to the
market. Then the scheduler collects these bids and computes
a service price to clear the market so that the supply of
the resource to be traded equals the demand. In particular,
all TEs are charged the same service price at one time slot.
The scheme can maximize the profits of ESs. In the second
game, in order to reduce costs, TEs determine the amount of
assigned tasks for each time slot based on the price of that
time slot. If the price of one time slot is high, there would
be fewer tasks assigned, and if the price is low, there would
be more tasks. This framework can encourage TEs to assign
fewer tasks during peak times or shift some tasks to off-peak
times, which flattens the demand curve by peak clipping or
valley filling.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• A bilateral-game framework is developed to model
the interactions among TEs and ESs.
• A supply function bidding mechanism is proposed,
where each ES submits a bid to reveal the available
capacity “supplied” to the market.
• A DTOA is designed to compute the Nash equilib-
rium.
• Simulations show that the proposed mechanism
achieves the maximization of bilateral interests.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the related work about task outsourcing in MEC is
introduced. Section 3 models the task outsourcing problem
in the ESs’ and TEs’ sides. In Section 4, a DTOA is designed
to compute the Nash equilibrium in both sides. Section 5
presents simulations showing the performance of the new
approach using DTOA. Finally, conclusions are presented in
Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
In recent years, significant attention has been devoted to the
resource allocation in MEC networks [7]. Shi Yan et al. [8]
studied the access selection for unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) and bandwidth allocation of the base station (BS) in
a UAV assisted IoT communication network. Wherein, the
access competition among groups of UAVs is modeled as a
dynamical evolutionary game. The bandwidth allocation of
BSs is formulated as a noncooperative game. Authors in [9]
examined resource allocation for a multi-TE MEC offload-
ing system, which is formulated as a convex optimization
problem for minimizing the weighted sum of mobile energy
consumption.
Chunlin Li et al. [10] analysed a radio and computing
resource allocation problem between an access point and
multiple devices in MEC system. They designed a time
3average computation rate maximization algorithm to de-
termine the optimal transmit power, and time allocation
for the wireless devices. Junhui Zhao et al. [11] studied a
cloud-MEC collaborative computation offloading problem
that offloads tasks to automobiles in MEC vehicular net-
works. They developed a tasks allocation optimization and
collaborative computation offloading scheme to decide the
optimal strategies. An offloading algorithm for shortening
the computation time and increasing the system utility was
also designed. Yunlong Gao et al. [12] studied the optimal
tradeoff between resource consumption and user experience
in designing MEC systems. Cosmin Avasalcai et al. [13]
introduced a decentralized resource management algorithm
with the purpose of deploying IoT applications at the edge
of the network such that end-to-end delay is minimized.
Since the resources of an ES are limited, the ES can not
undertake the tasks coming from multiple TEs. So multiple
ESs are needed. Nevertheless, the matching problem be-
tween multiple ESs and multiple TEs becomes a key issue.
Heli Zhang et al. [14] modeled the matching relationship
between ESs and TEs as a commodity trading by apply-
ing a multi-round sealed sequential combinational auction
mechanism. In [15], the authors studied task offloading in
vehicular MEC environments and modelled the interactions
between edges and tasks as a matching game. They further
developed two standalone heuristic algorithms to minimize
the average delay while taking the energy consumption and
vehicle mobility constraints into consideration. A three-tier
IoT fog network was proposed in [16], in which all fog
nodes, data service operators and data service subscribers
are jointly optimized to achieve the optimal resource alloca-
tion in a distributed fashion.
Furthermore, authors in [17, 18] adopted a price-based
mechanism to design efficient resource allocation in a MEC
network. For example, [17] proposed a price-based dis-
tributed method to manage the offloaded tasks from users.
Wherein, edge cloud sets prices to maximize its revenue and
each user makes an optimal decision to minimize her/his
own cost. The work [18] proposed a price-based resource
allocation mechanism among the MEC server and multiple
base stations (BSs). The MEC server tries to provide prices
to BSs so as to maximize its own revenue while the BSs
determine the computing space to improve the quality of
experience.
To summarize the related work above, we observe that
the existing resource allocation and matching problem in
MEC generally involves edge nodes and clients using re-
source from an edge node. However, most of these studies
focus either on the system performance or ESs’ benefits,
while ignoring the TEs’ pursuit of maximizing payoff.
Against this backdrop, our paper tries to balance the ob-
jectives of both ESs and TEs. In this paper, we also adopt
a priced-based supply bidding mechanism to solve the
resource allocation problem.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 Interaction between TEs and ESs
As shown in Fig. 2, we consider a scheduler-based resources
transaction market, which consists of M ESs and N TEs in
a MEC network. ESs act as suppliers who sell computing
TE 1
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TE 2
TE N
ES 1
ES 2
ES M
Load
price
Demand Profiles
Demand1
Demand2
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Total
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Fig. 2: Diagram of a resources transaction market.
resources to TEs and TEs act as customers who purchase
resources from ESs. The bidirectional interaction between
ESs and TEs is performed through a scheduler, which serves
as a third-party agency outsourcing TEs’ tasks to ESs.
On the one hand, TEs submit their demand profiles to
the scheduler via a communication network. On the other
hand, ESs compete with each other for acquiring more TEs,
and submit bids based on strategies of their opponents and
their own resource capacities. As a response, the scheduler
calculates the service price and the aggregated load based
on ESs’ bids and TEs’ total demand. They are mutually
dependent upon each other as decisions on either side can
have a bearing on those of the other side. After receiving
the real-time price signal, the TEs will update their demand
profiles. Since the aggregate load depends on the TEs’
demand profiles, the behavior of TEs will affect the ESs’
bidding strategies. The aforementioned process is repeated
until both customers and suppliers are satisfied.
We divide one day into a set of T (T = 24) time slots,
denoted as T = {1, · · · , T }. The set of ESs and TEs are
represented asM = {1, · · · ,M} andN = {1, . . . , N}. How
many resources should ESs provide to the market and how
the ESs’ bids affect the TEs’ demand profiles are questions
worth investigation.We next present the model of both sides
in the MEC resources transaction market.
3.2 Cost and profit of ES
For ES j ∈ M, let Cj,t(.) denote the cost function of ES
j at time slot t (t ∈ T ). Let Rj,t(.) denote the revenue
function of ES j at the tth time slot by providing the
computational load. The profit of ES equals the revenue
by providing computing service minus its cost of system
overhead. Therefore, the profit Pj,t of ES j at time slot t can
expressed as follows:
Pj,t = Rj,t(.)− Cj,t(.). (1)
We consider that each ES is selfish and tries to maximize
its own profit. Thus, the interaction among the profit max-
imizer ESs can be modeled as a noncooperative game. The
ESs are the players while the bid profiles are the strategies.
Let λj,t denote the bid of ES j at time slot t. The target of
each ES j is to find the optimal bid λj,t to maximize its
profit, which can be defined as:
maximize
λj,t
Pj,t j ∈M, t ∈ T . (2)
4By substituting Equ. (1) into Equ. (2), we can get
maximize
λj,t
Rj,t(.)− Cj,t(.) j ∈M, t ∈ T . (3)
We denote by fj,t the task load that ES j willing to
generate in the time slot t. We assume that the service price
of different ESs in one time slot is the same and denoted as
pe(t) at time slot t. The revenue of each ES is equal to the
product of its load and the service price. Hence, the revenue
of ES j at time slot t can be represented as
Rj,t = fj,t · pe(t). (4)
Similar to [19], the ES j’s cost function is defined as a
quadratic function
Cj,t (fj,t) = aj,2f
2
j,t + aj,1fj,t + aj,0,
where aj,2, aj,1 and aj,0 are positive coefficients and model
the fact that different ESs incur different costs for serving
the tasks. We note that the cost function is increasing and
convex. Substituting Equ. (4) into Equ. (3), the optimization
problem can be further rewritten as
maximize
λj,t
fj,t · pe(t)− Cj,t(fj,t)
subject to fj,t ≥ 0, j ∈ M, t ∈ T .
(5)
3.3 Payoff and payout of TE
The demand of each TE consists of two parts: a base demand
and a shiftable demand. On the one hand, a base demand is
primarily concerned with real-time tasks, which have high
priority. On the other hand, a shiftable demand has low
priority real-time requirements and it can be assigned at any
time slot. The shiftable demand profile of TE i (i ∈ N ) is
defined as χi = (χi,1, . . . , χi,T ) and the base demand of TE
i at time slot t is denoted as ri,t, which is known and fixed.
The utility of TE i represents the profit that TE i receives
when it completes tasks and is denoted as Ui(.). Exactly, the
utility function of TE i is the utility for the tasks rather than
the service time or applications. Similar to [20], we employ
the quadratic utility function because it is non-decreasing
and its marginal benefit is non-decreasing,
Ui(x) =


wi,tx−
αi,t
2
x2, 0 ≤ x ≤
wi,t
αi,t
w2i,t
2αi,t
, x >
wi,t
αi,t
, (6)
where x = (χi,t + ri,t), wi,t and αi,t, i ∈ N are coefficients
that reflects the dynamic changes of TE i’s demand.
The payout function quantifies the payout that TE i
needs to pay the ESs task completion. Without loss of
generality, we define the payout of TE i’ as the product of
demand and the service, i.e.
Payouti,t = (χi,t + ri,t) · pe(λt, Lt). (7)
The payoff function quantifies the final benefits of TE i and
represents the satisfaction of using the service. Thus, we
denote the payoff of TE i as its utility minus payout i.e.
Payoffi = Utilityi − Payouti. (8)
Let ui denote the payoff of TE i. By substituting Equ. (6) and
Equ. (7) into Equ. (8), we can obtain
ui (χi,χ−i) =
∑
t∈T
(
Ui (χi,t + ri,t)
− (χi,t + ri,t) pe (λt, Lt)
)
,
(9)
where χ−i denotes the vector of the demand profile of other
TEs and χ−i = (χ1, . . . ,χi−1,χi+1, . . . ,χN ). In Equ. (9),
the utility is a function related to (χi,t + ri,t).
Each TE tries to maximize its payoff by determining
its shiftable demand profile. Thus, the interaction between
TEs can be modeled as a noncooperative game. The TEs
are participants while the shiftable demand profiles are the
strategies of the noncooperative game.
Let χ∗i denote the optimal demand profile of TE i in the
Nash equilibrium and Qtotali denote the total daily shiftable
demand of TE i which is fixed and known. Let Lt denote
the aggregate load demand of the ESs at time slot t and
Lt =
∑
j∈N (χj,t + rj,t). Considering TE i, the optimization
problem can be formulated as follows when other TEs’
profiles are fixed:
maximize
χi
ui (χi,χ−i)
subject to
∑
t∈T
χi,t = Q
total
i ,
χi,t ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N .
(10)
3.4 Market mechanism with supply function bidding
In this section, we employ a supply function bidding mecha-
nism to model the relationship between market demand for
services and its price. We use a class of supply functions
with parameters. The bids submitted by ESs reveal their
available resource capacities “supplied” to the market.
TABLE 1: Definitions of Mathematical Notations
Notation Definition
Lt TEs’ total load demand at time slot t
fj,t The supply function of the ES j at time slot t
pe(t) The computing service price at time slot t
p1, · · · , pK
K break points of the price-wise linear function of
all ESs
λkj,t
The slope of the function between the break points
pk−1 and pk
λ1j,t
The slope of the function between the origin and
break point p1
The notations used in the supplier side model are pre-
sented in Table 1. We assume that the supply function fj,t is
chosen from the family of increasing and convex price-wise
linear functions of pe(t) [21]. Fig. 3(a) shows an increasing
and convex piece-wise linear supply function. The abscissa
pe(t) indicates the price and the ordinate fj,t denotes the
load supplied by the TE j at time slot t. There existsK break
points on the abscissa of the Fig. 3(a). λkj,t ≥ 0 represents the
slope of the function between the break points pk−1 and pk.
Fig. 3(b) shows the affine supply function.
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Fig. 3: (a) Piece-wise linear. (b) Affine supply functions.
At time slot t (t ∈ T ), we use the vector λj,t =
(λ1j,t, · · · , λ
K
j,t) to denote the bid profile of ES j (j ∈ M).
Thus, we obtain
fj,t (pe(t),λj,t)=


λ1j,tpe(t), 0 ≤ pe(t) ≤ p1
λkj,tpe(t)+λ
k−1
j,t pk−1, pk−1 < pe(t) ≤ pk
.
(11)
It is assumed that each ES submits λj,t as a bid profile
to the scheduler at time slot t. For each ES j, the bid
profile describes the number of tasks that it is willing to
admit. We can use λt to represent the bid profiles of all
ESs at time slot t and λt = {λ1,t, · · · ,λM,t}. In response
to ESs, the scheduler sets the price pe(t) to clear market.
In economics, market clearing means the supply of what is
traded equals the demand, so that there is no leftover supply
or demand. In this case, the demand of all TEs is the same
as the load supplied by all ESs. Although the fluctuation
in TEs’ demand will drive changes in ESs’ bid profiles,
the demand and supply remains balanced. The equivalence
further builds up the connection between the supplier game
and the customer game. Hence, it can expressed as∑
j∈M
fj,t (pe(t),λj,t) = Lt, t ∈ T . (12)
According to Equ. (11) and Equ. (12), we have
Lt=


∑
j∈M
(
λ1j,tpe(t)
)
, 0 ≤ pe(t) ≤ p1
∑
j∈M
(
λkj,tpe(t)+λ
k−1
j,t pk−1
)
, pk−1 < pe(t) ≤ pk
.
(13)
According to Equ. 13, we can further calculate the service
price function as follows:
pe(t)=


Lt∑
j∈M λ
1
j,t
, 0 ≤ pe(t) ≤ p1
Lt −
∑
j∈M
(
λk−1j,t pk−1
)
∑
j∈M λ
k
j,t
, pk−1 < pe(t) ≤ pk.
.
(14)
At time slot t, the service price of different ESs is the same.
In [22], the affine supply function fj,t (pe(t),λj,t) =
λ1j,tpe(t) is used as a special case of the aforementioned
piece-wise linear functions. Almost all the results of affine
supply functions can be generalized to the piece-price affine
supply function [23]. As for Equ. (14), it can be concluded
that the affine function is equivalent to the piece-wise linear
supply function between two break points. Each piecewise
function of Fig. 3(a) can be regarded as a linear function in
Fig. 3(b). As a matter of fact, the term λk−1j,t pk−1 is fixed
when we are between break points pk−1 and pk. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we generalize the results from the
affine functions to piece-wise linear functions. Therefore, the
computing service price can be given as follows for an affine
supply function:
pe(t) =
Lt∑
j∈M λ
1
j,t
, t ∈ T . (15)
For simplicity, we use the notation λj,t instead of λ
1
j,t
to represent the affine supply function of ES j. Meanwhile,
we use λt = (λ1,t, . . . , λM,t) to denote the bids profile for
all ESs at time slot t. As Equ. (15) shows, the computing
service price is related to λj,t (j ∈ M) and Lt. Hence, the
price function can be denoted as pe (λt, Lt). As suggested
by Equ. (11), supply function fj,t for ES j can be expressed
as
fj,t (pe (λt, Lt) , λj,t) =
λj,tLt∑
r∈M λr,t
, t ∈ T . (16)
Similar to the computing service, the supply function
can be represented by fj,t (λt, Lt). Let λ−j,t denote the
submitted bids of other ESs except for ES j. So it can be de-
fined as λ−j,t = (λ1,t, . . . , λj−1,t, λj+1,t, . . . , λM,t). Hence,
According to Equ. (5) and Equ. (16), the profit function of
ES j is rewritten as
Pj,t(λj,t,λ−j,t) =
λj,tL
2
t(∑
r∈M λr,t
)2 − Cj
(
λj,tLt∑
r∈M λr,t
)
.
(17)
When other ESs’ bids are fixed, the ES j tries to find
the optimal bid λ∗j,t by solving the following optimization
problem:
maximize
λj,t
λj,tL
2
t(∑
r∈M λr,t
)2 − Cj
(
λj,tLt∑
r∈M λr,t
)
subject to λj,t ≥ 0, j ∈ M, t ∈ T .
(18)
3.5 Nash equilibrium analysis
The following section will explain that the ES’s game (Equ.
(18)) has a unique Nash equilibrium, as shown by the lemma
below.
Lemma 3.1. Assume that the bids profile in Nash equilibrium
at time slot t is denoted as λ∗t . When the Nash equilibrium is
reached, it will satisfy λ∗j,t <
∑
r∈M,r 6=j λ
∗
r,t for all ESs.
Proof. The function Πj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t) is expressed as follows:
Πj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t) =
λj,tL
2
t(∑
r∈M λr,t
)2 . (19)
6As the formula above suggests, Πj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t) is the
first term in Pj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t). From Equ. (19), we can calcu-
late the first derivative function as follows
dΠj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t)
dλj,t
=
L2t ·
(∑
r∈M λr,t
)2
− 2λj,tL2t
(∑
r∈M λr,t
)
(∑
r∈M λr,t
)4
(20)
Let
dΠj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t)
dλj,t
> 0,
we can get (∑
r∈M
λr,t
)2
− 2λj,t
∑
r∈M
λr,t > 0. (21)
The Equ. (21) is equivalent to
λj,t + ∑
r∈M,r 6=j
λr,t


2
− 2λj,t

λj,t + ∑
r∈M,r 6=j
λr,t

 > 0.
(22)
From Equ. (22), we can derive that
0 ≤ λj,t <
∑
r∈M,r 6=j
λr,t.
In summary, we can conclude that Pj,t (λj,t,λ−j,t) is an
increasing function when 0 ≤ λj,t <
∑
r∈M,r 6=j λr,t. And it
becomes a decreasing function when λj,t ≥
∑
r∈M,r 6=j λr,t.
Thus, in order to maximize profit, we should meet the con-
straint 0 ≤ λj,t <
∑
r∈M,r 6=j λr,t. In the Nash equilibrium,
the bid of ES j at time slot t is denoted as λ∗j,t. Therefore, we
can conclude that λ∗j,t <
∑
r∈M,r 6=j λ
∗
r,t (j ∈M).
Similar to [24], the proof for the following theorem given
as follows.
Theorem 3.1. The ES’s noncooperative game has a unique Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium is the solution of
the following convex optimization problem:
maximize
0≤fj,t<
Lt
2
∑
j∈M
−Ψj (fj,t)
subject to
∑
j∈M
fj,t = Lt,
(23)
where
Ψj (sj,t) =
(
Lt − fj,t
Lt − 2fj,t
)
Cj (fj,t)−
∫ fj,t
0
LtCj (Πj)
(Lt − 2Πj)
2 dΠj .
(24)
Proof. According to lemma 3.1, we can infer that the load
supplied by each ES at time slot t does not exceed Lt/2
at the Nash equilibrium. The Lagrange function of the
optimization problem in Equ. (23) is denoted as F . Thus,
we have
F =
∑
j∈M
−Ψj (fj,t) + φ

∑
j∈M
fj,t − Lt

 , (25)
where φ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. We can obtain
the following expression through the first-order optimality
function. (
∂F
∂f∗j,t
)(
fj,t − f
∗
j,t
)
≤ 0, ∀j ∈M, (26)
where f∗j,t is defined as the supply function in equilibrium,
while φ∗ is the Lagrange multiplier in equilibrium.
From Equ. (24), (∂F/∂f∗j,t) can be expressed as follows:
∂F
∂f∗j,t
= φ∗ −
(
Lt − f∗j,t
Lt − 2f∗j,t
)
C′j
(
f∗j,t
)
. (27)
We assume the first-order optimality condition for the
optimization problem in Equ. (18). Thus, we obtain(
∂Pj,t
∂λj,t
)(
λj,t − λ
∗
j,t
)
≤ 0, ∀j ∈ M. (28)
From Equ. (17), ∂Pj,t/∂λj,t is calculated as follows:
∂Pj,t
∂λj,t
= pe (λt, Lt)−
Lt − f
∗
j,t
Lt − 2f∗j,t
C′j
(
f∗j,t
)
. (29)
By substituting Equ. (29) into Equ. (28), we can write the
optimality condition for Nash equilibrium as follows(
pe (λt, Lt)−
Lt − f∗j,t
Lt − 2f∗j,t
C′j
(
f∗j,t
)) (
λj,t − λ
∗
j,t
)
≤ 0. (30)
From Equ. (26) and Equ. (30), we can see that the
Lagrange multiplier is actually the price pe(λt, Lt) of the
computing service. In addition, the optimality condition
Equ. (26) is equivalent to Equ.30. Therefore, the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is equivalent to
proving the existence and uniqueness of the optimal point
of problem Equ. (23).
In Theorem 3.1, it is proved that the ES’s game has
a unique Nash equilibrium solution, whose strategies are
determined by the aggregate load Lt. Besides, a ES can
scale-up and scale-down its resource capacity according to
different market demands. Thus, ESs will bid differently for
different levels of load.
We next analyze the existence of Nash equilibrium for
the customer side game, which is proved by the theorem
below.
Theorem 3.2. The customers’ optimization problem is a convex
programming problem. In fact, the customer side game Equ. (10) is
an n-person game. It has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. From the above discussion it follows that the objec-
tive function in Equ. (10) is equal to∑
t∈T
Ui (χi,t + ri,t)
−
∑
t∈T
(
(χi,t + ri,t)
2 +
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i (χj,t + rj,t)∑
r∈M λr,t
)
.
(31)
Let k = 1/(
∑
r∈M λr,t), k > 0. For simplicity, we denote the
right part of Equ. (31) as follows:
hi(χi,χ−i) =
∑
t∈T
k
(
(χi,t + ri,t)
2
+
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
(
χj,t + rj,t
))
.
7We have
∇χihi(χi,χ−i) =
[
∂hi(χi,χ−i)
∂χi,t
]T
t=1
=
(
∂hi(χi,χ−i)
∂χi,1
, · · · ,
∂hi(χi,χ−i)
∂χi,T
)
= 2k

(χi,t + ri,t) + ∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
(χj,t + rj,t)


T
t=1
(32)
and the Hessian matrix is as follows:
∇2χihi(χi,χ−i) =


2k 2k · · · 2k
2k 2k · · · 2k
...
...
. . .
...
2k 2k · · · 2k


N×T
. (33)
This further leads to
XT∇2χihi(χi,χ−i)X = 2k (X1 +X2 + · · ·+XN×T )
2 ≥ 0,
∀X = (X1, X2, · · · , XN×T )
T
.
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of hi(χi,χ−i) is positive
semi-definite and hi(χi,χ−i) is convex. Moreover, since
the utility function Ui(.) is continuous and strictly concave
in the strategy space, the payoff function Equ. (9) of each
TE i (∀i ∈ N ) is strictly concave. So the objective func-
tion in Equ. (31) is concave. Hence, Equ. (10) is a convex
optimization problem. Meanwhile, since the constraints of
Equ. (10) are inequalities or linear equations, the feasible
domain is convex. Thus, the TEs’ optimization problem
is a convex programming problem. Hence, the TE’s game
is a strictly concave N -person game. Since the demand
profile sets are closed, bounded and convex, the existence
of Nash equilibrium can be proved based on [25, Theorem
1]. Analogously to [25, Theorem 3], for a concave N -person
game, there exists a unique equilibrium solution. Therefore,
the theorem is proved.
In the Nash equilibrium, for any given ESs’ bids, no
TE can increase its payoff by a unilateral change on its
strategy. In the next section, a task outsourcing algorithm
is developed to determine the point for both ES and TE’s
games.
4 DISTRIBUTED TASK OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a distributed task outsourcing
algorithm to demonstrate the interaction among TEs and
ESs. Our method is referred as DTOA. Let g be the iteration
number.
Notations:
Let χgi,t denote the demand profiles of TE i in iteration g
at time slot t and vector χgi denote the demand profile of TE
i for all time slots. The matrix χ = (χ1, . . . ,χt, . . . ,χT )
T
denotes the demand profiles of all TEs in iteration g for all
time slots. Let matrix λ = (λ1, . . . ,λt, . . . ,λT )
T
denote the
bids of all ESs for all time slots. Lgt denotes the aggregate
loads in iteration g at time slot t. pge (λ
g
t , L
g
t ) denotes the
computing service price in iteration g at time slot t.
As shown in Fig. 4, the interaction between ESs and TEs
can be modeled as a two-stage game. They interact with
each other to determine optimal bids and demand profiles.
The detailed process is depicted in Algorithm 1 and 2.
• The ESs try to maximize their profits by determining
their own bids according to optimization function
Equ. (18).
• The TEs will then adjust their demand profiles fol-
lowing optimization function Equ. (10).
?????????
??????????????????????????????
????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
Fig. 4: Interactions between the ESs, TEs and scheduler.
Algorithm 1 TE’s game
1: Initialization: g = 0.
2: Randomly initialize TEs’ demand profiles.
3: repeat
4: for (each time slot t ∈ T ) do
5: Receive Lgt from the scheduler.
6: Update the bid λgt by Algorithm 2.
7: Receive the updated pge (λ
g
t , L
g
t ) from the scheduler.
8: for (each TE i ∈ N ) do
9: χg+1i,t =
[
χgi,t + η2
∂ui(χ
g
t )
∂χ
g
i,t
]+
.
10: end for
11: end for
12: g := g + 1.
13: until
∥∥χg − χg−1∥∥ < ǫ.
Algorithm 2 ES’s game
Input: Total load at time slot t: Lt, t ∈ T and t.
Output: Bids of all ESs at time slot t: λt.
1: Initialization: Randomly initialize ESs’ bid profiles for the
first time.
2: Receive Lt from the scheduler.
3: for (each ES j ∈M) do
4: λg+1j,t =
[
λgj,t + η1
∂Pj,t(λ
g
t )
∂λ
g
j,t
]+
.
5: end for
6: return λt.
The DTOA can be described as follows. Firstly, the sched-
uler randomly initializes the TEs’ demand profiles and ESs’
bid profiles. Secondly, the TE i (i ∈ N ) sends the shiftable
demand profile χgi to the broker and receives L
g
t from it.
Then, the ESs will receive a signal to update their bids based
on the following iterative equation:
λg+1j,t =
[
λgj,t + η1
∂Pj,t (λ
g
t )
∂λgj,t
]+
, ∀t ∈ T . (34)
where η1 is the step size. [·]+ in Equ. (34) is the projection
onto the feasible set defined by the constraints λj,t ≥ 0.
8It is noticed that the ES j (j ∈ M) does not know other
ESs’ bids. In this aspect, the DTOA can also preserve the
privacy of participants. Thirdly, the computing service price
pge (λ
g
t , L
g
t ) is updated by the scheduler according to Equ.
(15). The TEs will further be informed to update their
shiftable demand profiles using a gradient boosting method:
χg+1i,t =
[
χgi,t + η2
∂ui (χ
g
t )
∂χgi,t
]+
, ∀t ∈ T . (35)
η2 is the step size. [·]
+ in Equ. (35) is the projection onto
the feasible set defined by the constraints
∑
t∈T χi,t =
Qtotali and χi,t ≥ 0. It is worth remarking that Equ. (10)
needs the updated price pge (λ
g
t , L
g
t ) and L
g
t to determine(
∂ui (χ
g
t )/∂χ
g
i,t
)
. Besides, since
(
∂ui (χ
g
t )/∂χ
g
i,t
)
only de-
pends on its own demand profile and the price and there
is no need to know the demand profile of other TEs. Thus,
this fact protects the privacy of the TEs. Finally, the stopping
criterion of the algorithm is checked by the scheduler. If the
relative change of shiftable demand profiles during two con-
secutive iterations is lower than the value ǫ, the iterations
can be stopped. Otherwise, the TEs will continue computing
their demand profiles based on the newly updated price and
bids.
The optimization problems Equ. (18) and Equ. (10) will
converge to the optimal point by the projected gradient
method. In the end, the algorithm will converge. In the
equilibrium, the ESs are playing their equilibrium strategies
according to TEs’ tasks strategies, and the TEs also choose
their equilibrium strategies based on ESs’ submitted bids.
Thus when the Nash equilibrium is reached, none of the
ESs and TEs improve their profit.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Simulation experiment
In this section, we present a simulation experiment to val-
idate our theoretical analysis. We assume a MEC resource
exchange market has 10 ESs and 1000 TEs, which are willing
to participate in the DTOA scheme. There are 24 time slots.
The relevant parameters of the model are shown in Table
2. The base demand ri,t of each TE at each time slot is
randomly selected from [9660, 37065]. The shiftable demand
refers to real-time, non-shiftable tasks, which reflects the
changes in the total demand of all TEs at different time
slots. Since most loads are running in real-time pattern,
it is plausible to assume relatively low shiftable loads for
TEs. The shiftable demand χi,t of each TE is assumed to
be chosen randomly from 10% to 12% of its base demand.
And the total demand is the sum of the base demand and
shiftable demand. Considering the generation cost function
c (fj,t) = aj,2f
2
j,t + aj,1fj,t + aj,0 for each ES j (j ∈ M),
we assume that aj,2 is randomly generated in the interval
[4.76e-6, 4.76e-5], aj,1 = 0.001 and aj,0 = 0.001. The initial
values of η1 and η2 are set as 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
In order to find the optimal solution, the step size of next
iteration will be a little less than the previous one, namely
η1=η1*0.985 and η2=η2*0.98. The initial bids λj,t of ESs are
all set as 20000. The αi,t is set as 0.5 and ωi,t is randomly
selected from interval [0.8, 1.0]. Also, the ǫ is set equal to 0.3.
TABLE 2: System Parameters
System parameters Value(Fixed)-[Varied range]
Base demand ri,t [9660, 37065]
Shiftable demand χi,t [10%,12%]*Base demand
aj,2 [4.76e-6, 4.76e-5]
aj,1 (0.001)
aj,0 (0.001)
step size η1 (0.05), η1=η1*0.985
step size η2 (0.001), η2=η2*0.98
ES’s bid λj,t (20000)
αi,t (0.5)
ωi,t [0.8,1.0]
ǫ (0.3)
Fig. 5: Convergence of ES 1-10’s bids at time slot 5.
Fig. 6: Convergence of shiftable loads for TE 21-30 at time
slot 5.
95.2 Algorithm Convergence
The performance of our proposed DTOA is evaluated in
terms of its convergence. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the conver-
gence of ESs’ bids and TEs’ shiftable loads at time slot 5.
From Fig. 6, these ten TEs (TEs 21-30) are randomly selected
from 1000 TEs. The speed of convergence to the equilibrium
point depends on the step sizes and the stopping criterion
ǫ. As the number of iterations increases, the bids and the
shiftable load demands start from the initial values and they
gradually converge to stable values. In our experiment, the
algorithm converges after around 248 iterations. Hence, the
proposed DTOA is efficient and verifies the theoretical proof
presented above.
To demonstrate the computational complexity of the
algorithm, we evaluate the running time of the algorithm
for different number of TEs and ESs. As shown in Fig. 7,
the running time of the algorithm increases linearly with
the number of TEs N and it is almost independent of M .
This is because that by increasing the number of TEs and
ESs, the number of updates for TEs and ESs will increase
proportional to N and M , respectively. The update process
for TEs takes more time comparing with the updates for
ESs since the TEs need to consider load shifting during T
time slots (the projected gradient), which make the update
process more complex. From Fig. 7, the running time of the
algorithm is acceptable even for large number of TEs. So it
can be concluded that the algorithm is efficient and can be
implemented in scenarios with large number of TEs.
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Fig. 7: Running time of algorithm for different number of
TEs and ESs
5.3 Economic effects of algorithm
By participating in the DTOA scheme, the payout (see Equ.
(7)) represents TE’s expenditure on purchasing computing
resources. Fig. 8 shows the daily total payout for TE 1 to
TE 30 before algorithm and after algorithm. Compared with
before algorithm, the total payout of each TE after algorithm
is reduced. We can see that TEs can save around 5% of they
payout by participating in DTOA scheme. The vertical axis
of Fig. 8 shows the payouts of TEs are so huge, and even
a 5% savings reduces a large expenditure. Furthermore, as
shown in Fig. 9, the daily total payoff of each TE after
using the algorithm has increased than before algorithm.
The payoff (see Equ. (9)) is the utility of the calculation tasks
minus the payout. Although the green bar is only a little
more than the red bar chart, the payoff has also increased a
lot because its magnitude is large and arrives 109.
Fig. 10 displays the total profit of ESs 1-10 before and
after algorithm. The total profit of ES is the sum of the profit
of all time slots. From Fig. 10, we can see that the total
profit of each ES increases after applying DTOA because
the aggregate load profile becomes smoother; and hence,
the ESs’ generation cost decreases. Besides, the suppliers
aim to submit optimal bids that maximize their profits in
each time slot. The results of the algorithm are in line with
expectations, which shows the supplier side’s individual
rationality of our proposed method.
5.4 Peak-reducing effect of algorithm
For simulations, the initial state of TEs’ demand is assumed
to be load profile before algorithm. The aggregate load
profile becomes smoother after the DTOA. The dashed circle
shows the fluctuation of the demand including valley filling
and peak clipping. Normally, the peak load demand is
26200, while the peak load demand decreases to 23800 in
the case of the DTOA. Therefore, the peak load demands
are shifted from peak to off-peak time slots. Furthermore,
the load demand for each TE is shifted to time slots with
higher wj,t, which brings a higher payoff to the TEs. This
demonstrates that the proposed DTOA performs satisfacto-
rily in reducing the peak load demand.
Fig. 12 shows the PAR (peak-to-average ratio) index
with and without task scheduling in 24 time slots and for
different number of TEs. Before algorithm, since there are
high peak load and low average load, PAR index is high.
By applying DTOA, the peak clipping and valley filling are
achieved and the PAR index is low even for high number of
TEs. This demonstrates that the proposed task scheduling
method can shift the shiftable loads from peak periods to
off-peak periods effectively.
5.5 Influence of parameters on iteration numbers
In this section, we discuss the influence of some parameters
on the convergence speed of the algorithm. The convergence
speed of the algorithm is reflected in the round of algo-
rithm updates (iteration numbers). The smaller the iteration
numbers, the faster the algorithm converges. The bigger the
iteration numbers, the slower the algorithm converges.
Fig. 13 shows the influence of the parameter ǫ on itera-
tion numbers. ǫ is the stopping criterion of the algorithm. As
can be seen, the smaller the parameter ǫ, the more iterations
and the slower the algorithm convergence. This fact shows
that the stricter of the stopping criterion, the more times the
algorithm needs to be updated.
In Fig. 14, the influence of the parameter η2 on iteration
numbers are shown. Since the parameter η2 will change in
every round, as shown in Table 2, we set different initial
value of parameter η2 to show its impact on iteration
numbers. As can be seen, when other parameters are fixed,
with the initial value of parameter η2 becomes larger, the
number of iterations also increases. In summary, the speed
10
Fig. 8: Daily total payout for TE 1 to TE 30.
Fig. 9: Daily total payoff for TE 1 to TE 30.
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Fig. 10: Daily total profit for ES 1 to ES 10.
Peak clipping
Valley filling
Fig. 11: Base and total demand before and after algorithm.
The peak shaving is achieved by using DTOA (the dashed
circle).
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scheduling
of the algorithm convergence is related to the setting of some
parameters.
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Fig. 13: The influence of the parameter ǫ on iteration num-
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6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze a practical resources transaction
market in a MEC network, where multiple different ESs
offering the optional computing service to TEs. Since the
resources of each ES are limited, the dynamic demand of its
TEs may not be met during spikes in demands. To overcome
the bottleneck of resource limitation, task outsourcing has
been regarded as an effective paradigm by accommodating
as many on-demand tasks as possible. We focus on the task
outsourcing problem among multiple ESs and multiple TEs.
A bidding mechanism is utilized to describe the serving
relationship between ESs and TEs, where the two parties
are assigned as sellers and buyers. The computing resources
of ESs are regarded as commodities.
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Simulations results demonstrate that the algorithm in-
creases the ESs’ profit and reduces the peak load by shifting
the load demand to off-peak periods. Meanwhile, the TEs’
payoff are also increased by participating in game process.
As for future research, we will focus on the computing
offloading of ESs in a three-tier IoT MEC networks.
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